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Abstract
Anonymising technologies are cyber-tools that protect people from online surveillance, hiding who they are, what information 
they have stored and what websites they are looking at. Whether it is anonymising online activity through ‘TOR’ and its onion 
routing, 256-bit encryption on communications sent or smart phone auto-deletes, the user’s identity and activity is protected 
from the watchful eyes of the intelligence community. This represents a clear challenge to intelligence actors as it prevents them 
access to information that many would argue plays a vital part in locating and preventing threats from being realised. Moreover, 
such technology ofers more than ordinary information protections as it erects ‘warrant-proof’ spaces, technological black boxes 
that no matter what some authority might deem as being legitimately searchable is protected to the extent that there are very 
limited or non-existent means of forcing oneself in. However, it will be argued here that not only is using such anonymising 
technology and its extra layer of protection people’s right, but that it is ethically mandatory. That is, due to the en masse surveil-
lance—from both governments and corporations—coupled with people’s limited awareness and ability to comprehend such 
data collections, anonymising technology should be built into the fabric of cyberspace to provide a minimal set of protections 
over people’s information, and in doing so force the intelligence community to develop more targeted forms of data collection.
Keywords Dark web · Privacy · Cyberspace · Intelligence · Surveillance · Paternalism · Security
Introduction
In a world where the Internet and cyberspace have perme-
ated almost every aspect of modern life, never before has 
the real world been so interconnected with the cyber. In 
developed societies, almost every aspect of life is becom-
ing digitised and processed through a computer system of 
some form. This computer revolution, however, is a double-
edged sword. That is, while people are now able to interact 
with a level of ease and expediency previously unseen, all 
the data on these interactions are constantly recorded and 
stored. This is something that has not escaped the attention 
of the intelligence community, who argue that by collect-
ing all of this data and examining it for patterns not only 
can they tell what someone has done but predict what they 
might do next.1 Unsurprisingly, people are concerned about 
access to their information and have, as a result, begun to 
utilise anonymising technology that secures their identity 
and online activity behind encryptions and auto-deletes. 
One of the most renowned tools for this is TOR, an easily 
downloadable program that allows a user online anonymity 
through onion routing—a form of layered encryption where 
the traic is processed through three nodes and encrypted at 
each stage so that the sender and destination are unknown as 
each intermediary knows only the location of the immedi-
ately preceding and following nodes.2 TOR circuits protect 
many kinds of ‘hidden services’ including website hosting 
denoted by the .onion URL, online messaging and VOIP 
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1 Oscar Gandy, ‘Data Mining and Surveillance in the Post 9/11 
Environment’ in Bell K and Webster F (eds.) The Intensiication of 
Surveillance: Crime, Terrorism and Warfare in the Information Age 
(London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2003) p. 28; Patrick Keefe, Chat-
ter: Dispatches From The Secret World Of Global Eavesdropping 
(New York: Random House, 2005) p.  99; Christopher Yang et  al. 
‘An Analysis of User Inluence Ranking Algorithms on Dark Web 
Forums’ Proceedings of ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Intelligence 
and Security Informatics (ISI-KDD), Washington, D.C., July 25, 
2010.
2 Timothy G. Abbott el at ‘Browser Based Attacks on TOR’ Pri-
vacy Enhancing Technologies Vol. 4776 (June 2007) p. 2. End-to-end 
encryption can play an important (though not necessary) part of this 
communication process as this can add an extra layer of protection by 
encrypting the information that is being sent to the server at the end 
of the chain and so can ensure that the message is encrypted to even 
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communications, and data sharing.3 This has resulted in the 
creation of what is commonly referred to as the ‘dark web’, 
the collected sum of these websites that allows anonymity to 
those who visit or conduct business through it.
Information protection, however, is not limited to bespoke 
software being used by a few individuals. Technology com-
panies have spent considerable time and efort to develop the 
most secure devices possible that prevents the individual’s data 
from being accessed by others. Most notably this has included 
storage devices such as mobile phones possessing auto-delete 
functions whereby if too many incorrect password attempts 
are made the data on the device is erased. This prevents the 
use of force attacks, where another computer tries all possible 
combinations in quick succession in the hope of identifying 
the correct one as the multiple incorrect attempts prompts a 
complete wipe of the memory.4 Or equally prominent is the use 
of end-to-end 256-bit encryption on instant-messaging appli-
cations such as WhatsApp, making the transmitted data for its 
some 900 millions users near impossible to access.5
The problem is that this technology has the potential to 
upset the relationship between the protections people have 
surrounding their privacy and the state’s ability to access that 
information when it is justiied in order to protect the politi-
cal community. This tension is itself not necessarily new. On 
the one hand intelligence actors have an ethical obligation 
to prevent threats from harming the political community, 
and having access to this information when justiied can 
play an important role in this. While on the other hand this 
online-data represents something that is most intimate and 
private to the individual. As people increasingly carry out 
their social and private lives online their virtual-self is ever 
more synonymous with their real-self and even just a cursory 
glance can give an insight into some of the most intimate 
aspects of someone’s life.6 Anonymising technologies that 
allow the individual to ‘go dark’7, however, go further than 
any previous protections, creating what former-FBI Direc-
tor James Comey termed as ‘warrant proof’ spaces—tech-
nological black boxes that no matter what some authority 
might deem as being legitimately searchable is protected to 
the extent that there are very limited or non-existent means 
of forcing oneself in.8 This, therefore, adds a new problem 
to the debate as it potentially sways the balance against the 
intelligence community irrevocably, preventing them from 
monitoring online activity or accessing digital information, 
even when they have a legitimate reason for doing so.
As a consequence some states have reacted in a con-
fused, knee-jerk or draconian way, including calls to ban 
the technology entirely; insisting on built-in backdoors 
or lower protection standards for authorities to exploit; or 
to assume all those who use such technology are inher-
ently guilty, prompting many government organisations to 
actively try to compromise TOR ‘not only in regions with 
repressive regimes but also in the free world’.9 In China, for 
example, its ‘Golden Shield Project’—also known as the 
Great Firewall of China—not only censors online content 
but also systematically probes for and shuts down any pro-
grams that might try to aid access to outside information 
or the dark web.10 While WhatsApp’s complex end-to-end 
encryption has raised questions in India where the new 256-
bit encryption is far above the oicially allowed and much 
4 Judiciary Committee, ‘Hearing on Apple iPhone Encryption’.
5 WhatsApp, ‘End to End Encryption’ WhatsApp Blog 5th April 
2016 Available at https ://blog.whats app.com/10000 618/end-to-end-
encry ption accessed 5/4/16. Rao, Leena ‘WhatsApp Hits 900  Mil-
lion Users’ Fortune 4th September 2015 Available at http://fortu 
ne.com/2015/09/04/whats app-900-milli on-users /.
6 Ian Sample, ‘Even basic phone logs can reveal deeply personal 
information’ The Guardian May 16th 2016 Available at https ://www.
thegu ardia n.com/scien ce/2016/may/16/even-basic -phone -logs-can-
revea l-deepl y-perso nal-infor matio n-resea rcher s-ind; David Solove, 
The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age 
(New York: New York University Press, 2004) p. 4.
7 The phrases ‘go dark’ and ‘anonymising technology’ will be used 
very broadly to cover all those technologies that protect the indi-
vidual’s personal data from intelligence access to such an extent that 
they essentially cannot be forced open through conventional means. 
This covers the more traditional understanding of the ‘dark-web’ tools 
such as Tor and Onion Routing that have created a particular section 
of cyberspace where online activity is anonymous. But it will also 
include technology that ofers other forms of protection, such as end-
to-end encryption used by communication applications or security 
measures on data storage devices such as mobile phones that prevent 
outside access and delete the data if force is applied.
8 Judiciary Committee, ‘Hearing on Apple iPhone Encryption’, 1st 
March 2016. Available at http://www.c-span.org/video /?40544 2-1/
heari ng-encry ption -feder al-inves tigat ions accessed 1/03/16.
9 Mauro Conti, Stephen Crane, Tommaso Frassetto, Andrei Home-
scu, Georg Koppen, Per Larsen, Christopher Liebchen, Mike Perry, 
and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, ‘Selfrando: Securing the Tor Browser 
against De-anonymization Exploits’ Proceedings on Privacy Enhanc-
ing Technologies 4 (2016) p. 454.
10 TOR, ‘Learning more about the GFW’s active probing system’ 
The TOR Project 14 September 2015 Available at https ://blog.torpr 
oject .org/categ ory/tags/china accessed 8th April 2016.
Footnote 2 (continued)
those at the end node and only accessible to the intended recipient. 
Michael G. Reed, P. Syverson, and David Goldschlag ‘Anonymous 
Connections and Onion Routing’ IEEE Journal on Selected Areas 
in Communications, 16/4 (1998) p. 482; David Goldschlag, Michael 
Reed and P. Syverson ‘Onion Routing for Anonymous and Private 
Internet Connections’ Communications of the ACM 42/2 (1999) 
39–41.
3 TOR, What Protections Does TOR Provide. Available at https ://
www.torpr oject .org/docs/faq.html.en#WhatP rotec tions DoesT orPro 
vide Other tools include Covercast, which is a ‘censorship circum-
vention system that broadcasts the content of popular websites in real 
time, encrypted videos streams on common live-streaming services 
such as YouTube’. See Richard McPherson, Amir Houmansadr, and 
Vitaly Shmatikov, ‘Covertcast: Using Live Streaming to Evade Inter-
net Censorship’ Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 3 
(2016) p. 212–225.
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quicker to crack 40-bit encryption.11 Indeed, after Adrian 
Ajao’s terrorist attack on Westminster killing four people, 
London 2017, where his last message was communicated 
through WhatsApp, the then UK Home Secretary Amber 
Rudd stated that it was ‘completely unacceptable’ to allow 
terrorists to communicate ‘in secret’, calling for an outright 
ban.12 Similarly, in the USA in early 2016 the FBI sought to 
compel technology company Apple to lower some of their 
security measures on their phones to enable them to force 
attack devices and gain access to stored data.13
As a result there are important unanswered questions in 
terms of if and when the individual has the right to erect such 
immovable barriers, and, as a result, how the state should 
respond. This paper will argue that privacy is a fundamen-
tal interest to individuals and when it falls below a certain 
level in key areas they are harmed. Also, that anonymis-
ing technology ofers a way of protecting this privacy and 
so represents a good in people’s lives. Moreover, not only 
do people have a right to use anonymising technology, but 
because online privacy is being routinely violated and given 
that there is a signiicant mismatch between what people 
perceive their privacy to be and the reality that surrounds 
it, it should be made a mandatory feature of cyber-systems. 
In turn this will raise the bar on people’s privacy protec-
tions signiicantly and prevent routine intrusions. However, 
privacy is part of a matrix of vital interests that individu-
als have that can occur to diferent degrees, others include 
their physical and mental integrity, liberty, self-worth and 
autonomy, and that in combination they represent an indi-
vidual’s security. Anonymising technology provides more 
than just privacy, but ‘privacy plus’—a set of barriers that 
make intrusions diicult or near impossible. For the intel-
ligence community this presents a limit on their ability to 
collect data and prevent threats to people’s other vital inter-
est, often their physical integrity. This means that is raises 
important concerns for the state on how it should react, and 
given the potential to overreact and unduly harm people’s 
interest in privacy this paper will examine what, if any, are 
the correct responses to be had by the state when dealing 
with anonymising technology.
Privacy, security and anonymising 
technology
The moral value of privacy in cyberspace cannot, and should 
not, be ignored. While privacy as a concept is extensively 
discussed, this does not necessarily mean it is particularly 
cohesive and has a ‘bewildering variety of meanings’ in 
both theory and practice.14 But regardless of whether one 
considers privacy as being boundaries of protection,15 or 
the ability to control information either related to or cre-
ated by the individual,16 it is clear that it has fundamental 
importance to both the individual and society as a whole.17 
At the heart of the moral importance of privacy is the argu-
ment that there are some interests that are fundamental to the 
human condition, pre-requisites to the furthering of an indi-
vidual’s interpretation of the good life. Joel Feinberg calls 
these requirements ‘welfare interests’ and John Rawls calls 
them ‘primary goods’, but essentially they both amount to 
the same thing, that is, regardless of what conception of the 
good life the individual holds, these preconditions must be 
satisied irst in order to achieve them.18 If these vital inter-
ests fall below a threshold level, the ability to realise their 
11 Andrew Griin, ‘WhatsApp end-to-end encryption update might 
have made chat app illegal in India’ Independent 8th April 2016 
Available at http://www.indep enden t.co.uk/life-style /gadge ts-and-
tech/news/whats app-end-to-end-encry ption -updat e-might -have-made-
chat-app-illeg al-in-india -a6974 921.html accessed 8th April 2016.
12 Gordon Rayner, ‘WhatsApp accused of giving terrorists ‘a secret 
place to hide’ as it refuses to hand over London attacker’s messages’ 
The Telegraph 27 March 2017. Available at: http://www.teleg raph.
co.uk/news/2017/03/26/home-secre tary-amber -rudd-whats app-gives 
-terro rists -place -hide/ accessed 27 March 2017.
13 Tim Cook, ‘A Message to Our Customers’ Apple 16th February 
2016 Available at http://www.apple .com/custo mer-lette r/.
14 Niel Richards Intellectual Privacy: Rethinking Civil Liberties in 
the Digital Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) p. 8.
15 Anita Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Soci-
ety (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littleield, 1988); L. Brandeis and S 
Warren, ‘The Right to Privacy’ The Harvard Law Review 4/5 (1980) 
pp. 193–220; P. Fairield, Public/Private (2005) p. 15; Ruth Gavison. 
‘Privacy and the Limits of the Law’ Yale Law Journal 89 (1980), 
pp. 421–471; Adam Moore ‘Privacy: Its Meaning and Value’ Amer-
ican Philosophical Quarterly, 40 (2003) pp.  215–227; Sissela Bok, 
‘Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation’ (New York: 
Pantheon, 1982).
16 G. Stoney Alder, Marshall Schminke, and Terry W. Noel, ‘The 
Impact of Individual Ethics on Reactions to Potentially Invasive 
HR Practices’ Journal of Business Ethics, 75/2 (2007) pp. 201–214; 
James Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construc-
tion of the Information Society (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard 
University Press, 1997) p.  54; Jerry Kang, ‘Information Privacy in 
Cyberspace Transactions’ Stanford Law Review 50/4 (1998) p. 1207; 
Edward Shils, ‘Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes’ Law and 
Contemporary Problems 31/2 (1966) p.  290; Alan Westin, Privacy 
and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967).
17 David Bazelan, ‘Probing Privacy’ Georgia Law Review 2/1 (1997) 
p. 588; Diane P. Michelfelder, ‘The moral value of informational pri-
vacy in cyberspace’ Ethics and Information Technology, 3, (2001) 
pp.  129–135; William Parent, ‘Privacy, Morality and the Law’ Phi-
losophy and Public Afairs 12/4 (1983) p. 276; David Solove, ‘Con-
ceptualising Privacy’ California Law Review 90/4 (2002) p.  1143; 
Michael Weinstein ‘The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life’ in Pri-
vacy: Nomos XIII edited by Pennock, J. R. and Chapman, J. W. (New 
York: Atherton Press, 1971) p.  99; Alan Westin, Privacy and Free-
dom (1967) p. 34.
18 Joel Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Vol. 1 Harm to 
Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) p.  37; John Rawls, 
Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) p. 62.
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more ultimate needs, goals or activities become dramatically 
hindered. In this way, these interests are the most important 
interests a person has, and thus demand protection. These 
vital interests include the need for physical and psycho-
logical integrity, liberty, autonomy, a sense of self-worth, 
and privacy. These vital interests are ends in themselves 
and are intrinsically valuable to the individual. The value 
of these interests is such that, as Feinberg argues, wrong-
ing them, even though someone might not directly experi-
ence it, means the individual is still harmed. For example, 
a camera inside an individual’s home constitutes a viola-
tion of his interest in privacy even if he is not aware of it 
and so does not ‘feel’ it in a ‘tangible or material way’.19 
In addition, many interests are interrelated and can play 
an important role in each other’s realisation. For example, 
privacy is necessary in order for individuals to relax, ind 
emotional release, self-relection and self-analysis, all key in 
maintaining psychological and emotional health.20 Equally, 
Beate Rossler argues that ‘ensuring autonomous life and 
behaviour… can only be successfully developed if there are 
protected private realms and dimensions in one’s life’.21 In 
addition, privacy plays an important part in both promot-
ing and maintaining the individual’s social role, facilitating 
social cohesion as individuals need a society with properly 
functioning privacy norms and rules to aid their interactions 
and to carry out their interests. As Raab argues, privacy 
represents a ‘“constitutive public good”: a societal good, 
understood as an integral and essential element of society 
itself’.22 As social beings privacy represents an important 
means through which the individual interacts with society, 
helping them determine what, if and when they reveal about 
themselves as well as forming a key part of their political 
expression and interaction.23
Understanding the value of privacy—as well as other vital 
interests—is important as it shapes the value that security 
has both for the individual and society as a whole. While 
Zedner is correct in that security is another ‘promiscuous 
concept’24—ranging in content, referent object and means 
of provision25—the value of security, and from there the 
right or expectation to have security, for this paper is directly 
linked to the value that an individual has in maintaining their 
vital interests.26 That is, security is the condition by which 
one’s vital interests are maintained and protected. This 
means contemplating security as the processes and protec-
tions designed to maintain people’s vital interests. For exam-
ple, at its core the vital interest in maintaining one’s physical 
integrity gives rise to the understanding of security as per-
sonal safety, thus ‘usually understood to refer to the protec-
tion against physical or other harm’ and to provide security 
therefore includes ‘the prevention of or resilience against 
deliberate attack’.27 Or, in terms of privacy, security refers 
to the protections one has, both physically and symbolically, 
that prevent outsiders from intruding on private spaces or 
accessing personal information without authorisation.
What this means for national security is that it has value 
in terms of protecting the individual’s vital interests as well 
as the health of the political community as an important 
means through which the individual enacts or realises both 
vital and further interests. As Adam Moore argues, ‘we value 
national security, not because some speciic political union 
is valuable in itself, but because it is a necessary part of 
protecting individual rights’.28 The value of the state, and the 
need for national security, is therefore drawn from the value 
of those individuals it is charged with protecting: ‘whatever 
19 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (1984) p. 35.
20 See Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (London: Bodley Head, 
1967) p.  34; Bazelan, D. ‘Probing Privacy’ Georgia Law Review 
Vol. 2 No. 1 (1997) p. 588; M. A. Weinstein, ‘The Uses of Privacy in 
the Good Life’ in Privacy: Nomos XIII edited by Pennock, J. R. and 
Chapman, J. W. (New York: Atherton Press, 1971) p. 99.
21 Beate Rossler, The Value of Privacy (John Wiley & Sons, 2015) 
p.  72; Also see Boudewijn de Bruin, ‘The liberal value of privacy’ 
Law and Philosophy, 29/5 (2010) p. 513; Andrei Marmor, ‘What is 
the right to privacy?’ Philosophy & Public Afairs, 43/1 (2015) p. 10.
22 Charles D. Raab ‘Security, Privacy and Oversight’ in Neal, A. 
W. (ed.) Security in a Small Nation: Scotland, Democracy, Politics 
(Open Book Publishers, 2017) p. 87.
23 Charles D. Raab ‘Security, Privacy and Oversight’ (2017) p.  87; 
Anita Allen Privacy Law and Society (Minneapolis: West/Thomson 
Reuters, 2011) p. 7–9.
24 Lucia Zedner, Security (Key Ideas in Criminology) (London: Rout-
ledge, 2009), p. 9.
25 For work on ‘security studies’ and the changes in referent object, 
the construction of security threats and security actors see Barry 
Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework 
for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Christopher Browning 
and Matt McDonald, ‘The Future of Critical Security Studies: Ethics 
and the Politics of Security’ European Journal of International Rela-
tions (2011): 1–21; Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press).
26 For more on there being a ‘right’ to security see: Liora Lazarus 
‘Mapping the Right to Security’ in Benjamin J. Goold and Lazarus L. 
(eds.) Security and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007); 
Liora Lazarus ‘The Right to Security—Securing Rights or Securitis-
ing Rights’ in R Dickinson et al. (eds.), Examining Critical Perspec-
tives on Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012).
27 Bruce Schneier, Beyond fear. Thinking Sensibly About Security in 
an Uncertain World (Berlin: Springer, 2006) p. 12. This is diferent 
from the instrumentalist arguments made by people such as Henry 
Shue whereby security is necessary for the enjoyment of other rights. 
See Liora Lazarus ‘The Right to Security—Securing Rights or Secu-
ritising Rights’ in Dickinson R. et al. (eds), Examining Critical Per-
spectives on Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012).
28 Adam Moore, ‘Privacy, Security, and Government Surveillance: 
Wikileaks and the New Accountability’, Public Afairs Quarterly, 
25/2 (2011), p. 142.
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rights and privileges states have, they have them only in 
so far as they thereby serve individuals’ fundamental inter-
ests’.29 Indeed, Ross Bellaby argues that the ethical value 
found within intelligence activity comes from their role in 
protecting the individual and the political community and 
this end shapes what activities they can justly carry out.30 
The state and its institutions therefore has value as the most 
current and appropriate means by which an individual’s vital 
interests are protected and allowed to lourish, as well as 
the most suitable representation of the political community.
This means that narratives that portray security and 
liberties as opposing qualities that must be traded or bal-
anced, while pervasive, are dangerous.31 By framing it as a 
trade-of between privacy and security, where you can have 
either security or privacy but not both and, importantly, 
where security is seen as a trump card,32 it is not surprising 
that ‘After 9/11 countries around the globe unhesitatingly 
adopted policies to enhance their government’s capacity 
to prevent terrorism… at the expense of individual civil 
liberties’.33 While Jeremy Waldron warns that even these 
framings are problematic in terms of unequal distribution of 
the trade-of, unclear returns for any given exchange and the 
problem of trading liberties at will,34 it is argued here that 
these framings fails to see how the matrix of vital interests 
should be taken as a whole, viewed holistically in order to 
provide an individual with enough of his vital interests that 
he can carry out his goals, and therefore be deemed secure. 
This means that ‘the overlapping or even isomorphic rela-
tionship between privacy and security is far more subtle than 
it might be imagined, and cannot be glossed over by a rheto-
ric of ‘opposed’ rights or values of security and privacy’.35
Security is therefore not separate from people’s interests, 
but an overarching formula by which they are ensured, and 
the role of the state is to negotiate the tensions between the 
various vital interests and seek to provide the necessary pro-
tections so that individuals can fulil their own version of 
the good life. Indeed, a ‘deining characteristic of liberal 
societies is that they provide their citizens with possibilities 
for living their life in accordance with their own particular 
ideas of the individual good’.36 This involves both limiting 
and licensing the power of the state, something expressed 
through the social contract that outlines the agreement of 
rational individuals to sacriice some of their freedoms in 
return for the state’s duty to protect their vital interests. 
Through public deliberation and debate these various vital 
interests are negotiated between people within a political 
community, holding the state to account in both its own 
coercive power over the population as well as in terms of its 
obligation to provide the necessary security.37 This relation-
ship and the limit/licensing power of state is then manifested 
in terms of human rights legislation which enable individu-
als to hold the state to account and its duty to secure those 
conditions.
In calculating how the diferent vital interests interact it 
is important to understand that they are not binary, whole 
one min and utterly destroyed the next, but exist to varying 
degrees given the context. The negotiation therefore involves 
understanding which and to what extent both the state and 
a perpetrator are threatening vital interest(s). As a process 
this involves, irst, all other things being equal, understand-
ing what vital interests are under threat as some interests 
such as physical and mental integrity can take precedence 
over the other interests such as autonomy, liberty, self-worth 
or privacy.38 Berlin declared that liberty and autonomy are 
36 Beate Rossler, The Value of Privacy (John Wiley & Sons, 2015) 
p. 43.
37 John Rawls Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, Sam-
uel Freeman (ed.), (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) 
p. 226.
38 Berlin declared that in much the same way that boots were more 
important than the words of Shakespeare, liberty and autonomy are 
not necessarily the total irst needs of an individual. Isaiah Berlin, 
Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
p. 124.
29 Cecile Fabre, ‘Cosmopolitanism, Just War Theory and Legitimate 
Authority’ International Afairs 84/5 (2008): p. 964.
30 Ross W. Bellaby, The Ethics of Intelligence: A New Framework 
(London: Routledge, 2014).
31 Jeremy Waldron ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’ 
The Journal of Political Philosophy 11/2 (2003) pp. 191–210; David 
Pozen, ‘Privacy-Privacy Tradeofs’ The University of Chicago Law 
Review, 83/1 (2016), pp.  221–247; Robert McArthur, ‘Reason-
able Expectations of Privacy’ Ethics and Information Technology, 3 
(2001) pp. 123–128.
32 Paul B. Thompson ‘Privacy, secrecy and security’ Ethics and 
Information Technology 3 (2001) pp. 13–19; Tiberiu Dragu, ‘Is There 
a Trade-of between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy 
Protections, and Terrorism Prevention’ The American Political Sci-
ence Review, 105/1 (2011), pp. 64–78; Derek E. Bambauer, ‘Privacy 
Versus Security’, The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 
103/3 (2013) pp. 667–683. For arguments against security necessarily 
trumping privacy see Adam Moore, ‘Privacy, Security, and Govern-
ment Surveillance: Wikileaks and the New Accountability’, Public 
Afairs Quarterly, 25/2 (2011) pp.  141–156. Arguments for security 
trumping privacy see Ken Himma, ‘Privacy vs. Security: Why Pri-
vacy Is Not an Absolute Value or Right’ San Diego Law Review, 44, 
(2007) p. 857.
33 Tiberiu Dragu ‘Is There a Trade-Of Between Security and Lib-
erty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention’ 
American Political Science Review 105/1 (2011) p. 64–78; Also see 
Bruce Ackerman Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in 
the Age of Terrorism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); 
Russell Hardin, ‘Civil Liberties in the Era of Mass Terrorism’ Jour-
nal of Ethics 8/1 (2004) p. 77–95.
34 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’ 
Journal of Political Philosophy 11/2 (2003) pp. 191–210.
35 Charles D. Raab ‘Security, Privacy and Oversight’ in Neal, A. 
W. (ed.) Security in a Small Nation: Scotland, Democracy, Politics 
(Open Book Publishers, 2017).
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not necessarily the irst need of an individual: ‘the peasant 
needs clothing or medicine before, and more than, personal 
liberty’.39 This is not to say that the other vital interests are 
not truly vital, for they are, but without physical and mental 
integrity the individual’s interest in autonomy, liberty, self-
worth or privacy can become redundant. Secondly, depend-
ing on the context the severity of the violation needs to be 
taken into account. Indeed, Nissenbaum argues for a context 
analysis of privacy where diferent social, structural or nor-
mative understandings of privacy can be enacted through 
people’s daily lives, which can overlap and come into con-
lict.40 For example, privacy can be perceived as consisting 
of diferent levels where the more personal or intimate the 
information the greater the expectation of privacy.41 There-
fore there must be a greater threat to someone’s other vital 
interests to justify the privacy intervention. Importantly, the 
point of ‘other things being equal’ demonstrates that the 
degree of harm caused is dependent on all aspects brought 
together. For example, saying that the interest in physical 
integrity is more important than autonomy is done while the 
severity or context of the violation is equal. It would be folly 
to argue that a prick on the inger is more harmful than being 
locked away for 20 years simply because it was a physical 
attack. Signiicantly, vital interests make a chain whereby the 
whole is no stronger than its weakest link.42 This means an 
excess of one will not necessarily make up for the lacking of 
another interest: all the self-worth in the world ‘will not help 
you if you have a fatal disease and great physical strength 
will not compensate for destitution or imprisonment’.43 So 
an excess of physical security cannot be used as a justiica-
tion for undermining people’s privacy; it cannot be argued 
that people are physically very safe in exchange for having 
no privacy. In making this negotiation it needs to be under-
stood whether the target has acted in some way to waive or 
forfeit their immediate vital interest protects; if there is a 
threat to the vital interests of another to a greater degree or 
in a more fundamental way; and that people’s vital interests 
being provided for to a minimum standard.
So in making this calculation it should be understood that 
the value of privacy in cyberspace is signiicantly high. By 
viewing information in terms of concentric circles where the 
closer one goes to the centre the more intimate the informa-
tion and the greater the expectation of privacy there is, it 
can be argued that online information should be considered 
as being highly private. Access to URL information (even 
restricted to before the irst/slash), for example, can relect 
intimate details about a person’s life such as an individual’s 
sexuality, political or social views, medical details, and 
inancial activity, and even analysis of people’s meta-data 
can be used to access sensitive personal data on where a per-
son goes and with whom he communicates.44 Indeed, argu-
ments have been made that unauthorised access to this data 
represents a serious violation of someone’s privacy because, 
irst, there has developed a high expectation of privacy in 
one’s everyday online activity, especially given the increased 
and pervasive use of cyberspace throughout people’s lives; 
second, because real world protections on analogous data 
sets—medical, inancial, social and political—already have 
high expectations of privacy; and third because it involves 
trespassing across a clearly deined barrier in terms of a per-
son’s personal computing devices or communication while 
in transit. 45
Therefore people can expect a signiicant degree of pro-
tection around their online activity. The implications of 
anonymising technology, however, are striking as it provides 
‘privacy-plus’; warrant proof spaces where a higher level 
of protection is achieved. Anonymising technology such as 
TOR and auto-deletes undermines the ability of the state 
to collect intelligence and in doing so hampering its ability 
to detect, locate and prevent a range of potential threats. 
However, even though these protections will hinder the intel-
ligence community’s abilities, from the point of view of the 
individual this does not diminish their right to establish 
whatever privacy protection they see it. Judith Thomson 
gives the example whereby if an individual wishes to put 
something precious to him in a safe to prevent others from 
looking at it, then it is his right to do so, and indeed repre-
sents a clearer demonstration that he wishes to stop others 
39 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (1969) p. 124.
40 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and 
the Integrity of Social Life (Standford Law Books, 2009) p. 127.
41 Gary Marx, ‘Some Concepts that May be Useful in Understand-
ing the Myriad Forms and Contexts of Surveillance’ Intelligence 
and National Security 19/2 (2004) p.  234; and Andrew von Hirsch, 
‘The Ethics of Public Television Surveillance’ in Ethical and Social 
Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention edited by Hirsch, 
A., Garland, D. and Wakeield, A. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) 
pp. 59–76.
42 Feinberg, J. Harm to Others (1984) p. 37; Nicholas Rescher, Wel-
fare: The Social Issue in Philosophical Perspective (Pittsburgh: Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Press, 1972) p. 5.
43 H. E. Baber, ‘How Bad is Rape’ Hypatia 2/2 (1987) p. 129.
44 Gary Marx, ‘Some Concepts that May be Useful in Understand-
ing the Myriad Forms and Contexts of Surveillance’, Intelligence and 
National Security, 19/2, 2004, p. 234; Andrew Hirsch ‘The Ethics of 
Public Television Surveillance’ in Ethical and Social Perspectives on 
Situational Crime Prevention edited by Hirsch, A., Garland, D. and 
Wakeield, A. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) pp. 59–76.
45 Robert L. McArthur ‘Reasonable Expectations of Privacy’ Ethics 
and Information Technology 3 (2001) pp.  123–128; Charles Fried, 
‘Privacy: A Moral Analysis’ Yale Law Review 77/1 (1969) p.  475; 
Hyman Gross, ‘Privacy and Autonomy’ in Privacy: Nomos XIII 
edited by Pennock, J. R. and Chapman, J. W. (New York: Atherton 
Press, 1971) p.  169; P. J. Steinberger, ‘Public and Private’ Political 
Studies 47/2 (1999) p. 292.
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from looking at what he owns. Breaking in would be a clear 
violation of his privacy.46 Moreover, when individuals lock 
away their private items it is not done in the knowledge that 
should the need arise the door can be blown of. It is not the 
responsibility of the individual—or safe manufacturers—to 
ensure this option. If we make Thomson’s safe crack-proof 
this does not undermine the individual’s right to use it, even 
to the detriment of possible future intelligence collection. 
Moreover, it is the state’s duty to demonstrate why such pro-
tections for speciic individuals should be necessarily pulled 
down. The individual is assumed innocent until proven 
guilty and the danger of demanding presumed access to an 
individual’s property lips this; that there is an assumption 
that they will be guilty of something and so the state will 
need access; or that using such protections is an inherent 
indication of future guilt as a form of pre-crime.47 What this 
means is that the state must be able to prove why particular 
individuals are warranted for surveillance—probably cause/
balance of probabilities for example—to justify its coercive 
powers. Any method that relies or uses bulk rather than tar-
geted surveillance would fail this requirement. Therefore, 
it can be argued that even though anonymising technology 
provides a nearly impenetrable barrier, the individual has 
the right to exert what protections they feel is required to 
ensure their privacy.
Not only a right, but an ethical need
Therefore, there is clearly an argument that can be made that 
people have the right to use anonymising technology despite 
it creating near impenetrable protections. This argument, 
however, can be pushed one step further in that not only is 
there a right but it is ethically mandatory to establish such 
privacy protections at a fundamental level of cyberspace, 
to include defences that automatically and systematically 
anonymise an individual’s identity and activity whether or 
not they have expressed an explicit desire. While such an 
argument might raise liberal concerns regarding overreach 
and interference in people’s lives, understanding such pater-
nalist concerns can help highlight why there is a need for 
such interventions.
Broadly speaking the paternalism literature is extensive 
and wide-ranging, crossing philosophy,48 political theory,49 
law,50 and economics,51 though as a general deinition pater-
nalism is the ‘interference with a person’s liberty of action 
justiied by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, 
good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person 
being coerced’;52 or ‘that it involves acting towards people 
in a way that promotes their own best interest whether or 
not they see this themselves’.53 While some argue that this 
interference is unjustiied because it is infantilising to the 
individual,54 most state the problem as the ‘violation of the 
person’s autonomy’55 or liberty as the ability for the person 
to chose their own destiny and carry it out is circumvented.56
However, these concerns surrounding autonomy can be 
used to highlight why there is a need for mandatory anony-
mous technology. First, if the main concern about pater-
nalism is the impact on people’s autonomy then the con-
text of the interference becomes important. Autonomy is 
another vital interest and broadly speaking is the capacity 
46 Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘The Right to Privacy’ Philosophy and 
Public Afairs 4/4 (1975) p. 298–303.
47 Lucia Zedner ‘Pre-Crime and Post Criminology’ Theoreti-
cal Criminology 11/2 (2007) 265; David Solove ‘I’ve Got Nothing 
to Hide and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy’ San Diageo Law 
Review, 44, (2007) p. 748.
48 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’ in Philosophy, Politics and Soci-
ety: Fifth Series, in Laslett P. and Fishkin J. (eds.) (Basil Blackwell, 
1979); Joel Feinberg, ‘Legal Paternalism’ in Paternalism. R. Sarto-
rius (ed.). (University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
49 Albert Weale, ‘Paternalism and Social Policy’ Journal of Social 
Policy 7 (1978) pp. 157–172.
50 Herbert L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (Oxford University 
Press, 1963); Seana Valentine Shrifrin ‘Paternalism, Unconscion-
ability Doctrine, and Accommodation’ Philosophy & Public Afairs 
29/33 (2000) p. 205–250; Paul Burrows, ‘Analyzing Legal Paternal-
ism,’ International Review of Law and Economics 15 (1995) pp. 489–
508; Duncan Kennedy, ‘Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Con-
tract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms 
and Unequal Bargaining Power’ Maryland Law Review 41 (1982) 
pp. 563–658; William Glod ‘Political Liberalism, Basic Liberties and 
Legal Paternalism’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy 48/22 (2010) 
pp. 177–196.
51 Paul Burrows, ‘Analysing Legal Paternalism’ International Review 
of Law and Economics 15 (1995) pp. 489–450.
52 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’ in Mill’s On Liberty: Critical 
Essays edited by G. Dworkin (Roman and Littleield Publishers: 
Plymouth, 1997) p. 62.
53 Peter Hobson, ‘Another Look at Paternalism’ Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, 1/2 (1984) pp. 293–304.
54 Peter de Marnefe, for example, suggests paternalism is insult-
ing as it substitution of the target’s judgement; while X characterises 
paternalism as treating another ‘like a child or someone who cannot 
be trusted to look after their own good’ Peter de Marnefe, ‘Avoid-
ing Paternalism Philosophy & Public Afairs’ 34 (2006) p. 68. Or as 
Anderson more bluntly puts it, paternalism involves ‘efectively tell-
ing citizens that they are too stupid to run their own lives’. Elizabeth 
Anderson, ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics 109 (1999) p. 301.
55 Gerald Dworkin The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 123.
56 Shane Ryan ‘Paternalism: An Analysis’ Utilitas 28/2 (2016) 
pp. 123–135; Gerald Dworkin The Theory and Practice of Autonomy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 123.
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for self-rule, that one must be able to decide for oneself, 
without external manipulation or interference, what shape 
one’s own life will take. As Nussbaum puts it, autonomy is 
being able to ‘form a conception of the good and to engage 
in critical relection about the planning of one’s life—the 
protection of the liberty of conscience’.57 This requires 
that the individual’s ability to function rationally is pro-
tected; that the individual has the capacity to plan, choose, 
and relect on options in terms of arguments, evidence and 
potential choices so as to make a decision; and can do it 
without excessive inluence or control from another.58 While 
anti-paternalism seeks to prevent interference with another’s 
autonomy, even for their beneit, those who lack the capac-
ity for critical self-relection whether it is due to an absence 
or reduced knowledge or ability—such as children or those 
who are physically or mentally unable—they are incapable 
of understanding what is in their best interests and so need 
paternalistic help to ensure they are protected. For example, 
Mill, on the subject of how long should children have their 
decision-making ability limited by parents, sets the limit as 
once the children are ‘capable of being improved by free and 
equal discussion’.59 As Feinberg puts it, interventions in only 
non-voluntary self-regarding actions do not afect people’s 
autonomy and should not be considered as paternalistic at 
all.60 Pro-paternalists, therefore, shape the justiication and 
need for intervention in terms of the lack of information 
had by the individual—their ignorance or ability to under-
stand what information they are given—or their hypotheti-
cal consent. That is, if individuals do not have the full facts 
before them or could not reasonably be able to comprehend 
its meaning then they are unable to make an informed deci-
sion; their capacity to relect on options available to them 
and determine for themselves what the most appropriate ver-
sion of the good is prevented and they are therefore unable 
to act autonomously. Indeed, in Mill’s example where we 
witness someone about to cross a dangerous bridge and we 
intervene to turn them back there is no ‘real infringement of 
his liberty’ as they are not aware of the structural weakness 
and it would not be their desire to fall.61 In fact, it can be 
argued lacking in the capacity for full autonomy demands 
an obligation on others to help provide or facilitate their 
realisation of a good life, whether the support is physical 
or in aiding in the necessary rational, critical relection.62 
Bill New expands this ignorance to include ‘failures of 
reasoning’ highlighting the technical inability to complete 
or understand the issues involved, a weakness of will, the 
distortive efect of emotions, and a lack of knowledge or 
experience.63 Feinberg further argues that the intervention is 
required until the target is adequately informed, and if they 
continue to be mistaken the intervention must continue until 
they realize their error.64 If an individual lacks autonomy 
then they are being harmed and so it is required that they be 
aided in order to restore their autonomy and stop the harm 
they are sufering under.
It can be argued, therefore, that anonymising technology 
protects people by providing them with their necessary pri-
vacy in a situation where their lack of knowledge or ability 
to understand means that they are non-autonomous agents, 
while also securing their autonomy through providing pro-
tected spaces for deliberation free from state surveillance 
inluencing their decision-making processes. The irst aspect 
of this argument is the general ignorance of people; that 
there is a signiicant disconnect between the sort of privacy 
people think they have and what is provided, as well as a 
57 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000) p. 79. 
Feinberg calls this the ‘Condition of self-government’, and Richard 
Lindley refers to it as ‘authorship’ and ‘self-rule’, but it is essentially 
referring to the same phenomenon. See Joel Feinberg, ‘The Idea of 
a Free Man’ in Educational Judgments: Papers in the Philosophy of 
Education edited by Doyle, J. F. (London: Routledge, 1973) pp. 143–
165; R. Lindley, Autonomy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986).
58 H. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person’, 
Journal of Philosophy 68/1 (1971) p. 7.
59 See John Kleinig Paternalism (Manchester University Press, 1983) 
p. 146.
60 Joel Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Vol.  3 Harm 
to self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) p.  12; Heidi Malm, 
‘Feinberg’s Anti-Paternalism and the Balancing Strategy’ Legal 
Theory 11 (2005) p. 194; Bill New, ‘Paternalism and Public Policy’ 
Economics and Philosophy 15 (1999) pp.  68–69; Tom Beauchamp, 
‘Paternalism and Biobehavioral Control’ Monist 60 (1977) p. 67.
61 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty”, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Repre-
sentative Government (New York: Dutton, 1910), ch. iv.
62 This argument turns from the paternalist literature to the good 
Samaritan one where, arguably, there is a general obligation to help 
those in need if we can at little cost to ourselves. See John Kleinig, 
‘Good Samaritanism’ Philosophy and Public Afairs 5/4 (1976) 
p.  385; Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976) p.  9; John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) p.  111, 152; E. Mack, 
‘Bad Samaritanism and Causation of Harm’ Philosophy and Public 
Afairs 9/3 (1980) p.  235. There is an extensive literature regarding 
the expectations of the good or minimal Samaritan. Peter Singer, 
‘Famine, Aluence, and Morality’ Philosophy and Public Afairs 
7/2 (1972) 229–243; Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978) p. 217–230; Patricia Smith, ‘The 
Duty to Rescue and the Slippery Slope Problem’ Social Theory and 
Practice 16/1 (1990) p.  19–41; John M. Whelan, ‘Charity and the 
Duty to Rescue’ Social Theory and Practice 17/3 (1991) p. 441–456; 
and David Copp, ‘Responsibility for Collective Inaction’ Journal of 
Social Philosophy 22/2 (1991) p.  71–80. However, while this is a 
general and arguably weak requirement, stronger obligations can be 
placed on the state to protect those who it has a duty to protect by 
virtue of the social contract.
63 Bill New, ‘Paternalism and Public Policy’ Economics and Philoso-
phy 15 (1999) p. 71–74.
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lack of awareness on the dangers of revealing too much 
information. This includes a general mismatch between 
assumed online protections and the realities of cyberspace 
as well as a speciic lack of awareness on the surveillance 
powers of intelligence actors such as the USA’s National 
Security Agency (NSA) and UK’s Government Communica-
tions Headquarters (GCHQ).
This includes, irst, a lack of awareness over what sort of 
protections people have when they surf the web, whether in 
terms of their daily online activity or in regards to their more 
public facing activities on social media websites such as 
Facebook.65 Firstly, evidence shows that people value their 
online privacy: when the UK public were asked speciically 
about online privacy in May 2014 they saw this being either 
‘essential’ or ‘important’ by a very large margin: for web 
browsing 85% saw privacy as being essential/important; 
for email content 91% saw privacy as essential/important; 
while for mobile phone location 79% saw privacy as essen-
tial/important. Moreover, the level of public concern about 
online privacy is relected in the yearly TRUSTe Privacy 
Index conducted by Ipsos-MORI, which reported that in 
2014 89% were frequently or always worried about their 
online privacy, which rose to 92% in 2015. 66
However research also shows that people are unaware of 
what information is being stored and transmitted. Indeed, 
there is a signiicant body of research that reports that in 
terms of online social media, even though there should be 
a greater awareness on the ability of others to access one’s 
information given its outward looking nature, there was a 
discrepancy between the level of privacy people expected 
in terms of who had access to what information and the 
actual safeguards in place.67 For example, Jones and Soltren 
reported that 89% percent of those users surveyed admitted 
that they had never read the online privacy policy and 91% 
were not familiar with any of their terms of service.68 One 
important part of the problem is that people do not conceive 
that outside audiences can view their information. Again, 
even public social media pages—whether Facebook, forums, 
blogs or web-chats—people see access to their data as being 
closer to a wall-garden rather than an open ield; that is, 
people believe that their information is only ‘visible to the 
peer group more than to adult surveillance’,69 imaging an 
ideal audience ‘which is often a mirror-image of the user’.70 
There is no expectation that the wider world (ranging from 
complete strangers, through to corporations and the govern-
ment institutions) can access their online data, with research 
showing a particularly strong aversion to authority igures 
having access.71 Indeed, the backlash following Edward 
Snowden’s revelations highlight a real lack of knowledge 
as to the abilities, willingness and drive had by the intelli-
gence community to collect data en masse. Even when peo-
ple reported the recognised need for data to be collected, 
65 Catherine Dwyer, Starr Roxanne Hiltz, and Katia Passerini, ‘Trust 
and Privacy Concern Within Social Networking Sites: A Compari-
son of Facebook and MySpace’ Proceedings of AMCIS (2007); Sonia 
Livingstone, ‘Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content Crea-
tion: Teenagers’ Use of Social Networking Sites for Intimacy, Privacy 
and Self-Expression’ New Media & Society, 10/3 (2008) pp.  393–
411; Zeynep Tufekci, ‘Can you see me now? Audience and Disclo-
sure Regulation in Online Social Network Sites’ Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society n28/1 (2008) pp. 20–36; Yabing Liu, Krishna 
Gummadi, Balachander Krishnamurthy, and Alan Mislove ‘Analyzing 
Facebook Privacy Settings: User Expectations vs. Reality’. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM Internet Measurement Confer-
ence (2011) pp. 61–70; Michelle Madejski, Maritza Johnson, and Ste-
ven Bellovin, ‘A Study of Privacy Settings Errors in an Online Social 
Network’ in Fourth International Worksop on Security and Social 
Networking (pp. 340–345). Lugano, Switzerland.
66 Vian Bakir, Jonathan Cable, Lina Dencik, Arne Hintz, Andrew 
Mcstay, ‘Public Feelings on Privacy, Security and Surveillance’ A 
Report by DATA-PSST and DCSS November 2015. Available at https 
://sites .cardi ff.ac.uk/dcssp rojec t/files /2015/11/Publi c-Feeli ng-on-
Priva cy-Secur ity-Surve illan ce-DATAP SST-DCSS-Nov20 15.pdf p.  6. 
Also see Jupiter Research, ‘Security and privacy data’ Presentation to 
the Federal Trade Commission Consumer Information Security Work-
shop. (2002) Available online at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/works hops/
secur ity/02052 01lea thern .pdf; Harris, National Survey on Consumer 
Privacy Attitudes. Available at http://www.epic.org/priva cy/surve y/.
67 Catherine Dwyer, Starr Roxanne Hiltz, and Katia Passerini, ‘Trust 
and Privacy Concern Within Social Networking Sites: A Compari-
son of Facebook and MySpace’ Proceedings of AMCIS (2007); Sonia 
Livingstone, ‘Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content Crea-
tion: Teenagers’ Use of Social Networking Sites for Intimacy, Privacy 
and Self-Expression’ New Media & Society, 10/3 (2008) pp.  393–
411; Zeynep Tufekci, ‘Can you see me now? Audience and Disclo-
sure Regulation in Online Social Network Sites’ Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society n28/1 (2008) pp. 20–36.
68 H. Jones and J. H. Soltren, Facebook: Threats to Privacy Decem-
ber 14, 2005. Available at from http://www-swiss .ai.mit.edu/6805/
stude nt-paper s/fall0 5-paper s/faceb ook.pdf. Also see Ralph Gross and 
Alessandro Acquisti, ‘Information revelation and privacy in online 
social networks’ Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Privacy 
in the Electronic Society (2005) pp. 71–80.
69 Sonia Livingstone, Taking Risky (2008) p.  396. Also see C. 
Lampe, N. B. Ellison, C Steinield, ‘Changes in Use and Perception 
of Facebook’ Proceedings of the ACM 2008 Conference on Computer 
Supported Cooperative Work p. 729.
70 Alixc E. Marwick & danah boyd, ‘I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Pas-
sionately: Twitter Users, Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audi-
ence’ New Media & Society 13 (2010) p. 7.
71 See Zeynep Tufekci, ‘Can you see me now? Audience and Disclo-
sure Regulation in Online Social Network Sites’ Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society n28/1 (2008) p p.  34; Scott Lederer, Jason 
Hong, Anind Dey, and James Landay. ‘Personal Privacy Through 
Understanding and Action: Five Pitfalls for Designers’ Personal 
and Ubiquitous Computing 8 (2003) pp.  440–454; Kate Raynes-
Goldie. ‘Aliases, Creeping, and Wall Cleaning: Understanding Pri-
vacy in the Age of Facebook’ First Monday 15/1(2010) available at 
http://first monda y.org/htbin /cgiwr ap/bin/ojs/index .php/fm/artic le/
view/2775/2432; Bernhard Debatin, Jennette P. Lovejoy, Ann-Kathrin 
Horn, and Brittany N. Hughes, ‘Facebook and Online Privacy: Atti-
tudes, Behaviors, and Unintended Consequences’ Journal of Com-
puter-Mediated Communication 15/1 (2009) pp. 83–108.
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often it was assumed that it would be other people’s data and 
not their own being amassed, and responses have thus been 
that the NSA had gone too far in both the breadth of surveil-
lance carried out and depth of information collected.72 It is 
therefore not surprising that Snowden’s revelations received 
signiicant shock in terms of the level and pervasiveness 
of the NSA surveillance apparatus and sparked demands to 
review surveillance powers.73
Another problem is that in addition to the harm caused 
by violating people’s intrinsically valuable privacy, people 
are unaware of the instrumental danger that access to pri-
vate online information can represent, including ‘damaged 
reputation… unwanted contact and harassment or stalking, 
surveillance like structures due to backtracking functions, 
use of personal data by third parties, and hacking and iden-
tity theft’;74 while there are additional concerns over the 
dangers of state surveillance in the form of a panoptic ‘chill-
ing efect’ that deters internet users from engaging in their 
online activities because of the fear caused by the belief 
they are being watched and the negative impact this can 
have on freedom of expression and the realisation of peo-
ple’s autonomy.75 Therefore, anonymising technology would 
promote a realm of greater autonomy exploration as people’s 
actions would be unmonitored and so they would not have 
to worry about a panoptic gaze. This works well for one of 
the concerns of many liberal and anti-paternalist theorists on 
the stiling efect outside intervention can have as particular 
standards of ‘correct’, ‘right’ or ‘true’ are imposed. What 
anonymising technology creates is a more open space for 
individuals to explore these issues themselves. Therefore, 
the technology not only restores people’s lost privacy but 
also their lost autonomy.
Moreover, even when there are instances where individu-
als have consented to access to their information—in terms 
of HTTP cookies (also known as browser cookies or just 
cookies) or accepting website ‘terms and conditions’ for 
example—there are signiicant technical barriers to under-
standing that limit the user’s ability to fully comprehend 
what it is they are agreeing to. For example, cookies are 
packets of information shared between user and websites 
on their activities, and even though the EU determined that 
websites should requests consent on their use, there is not 
suicient information provided and understanding required 
by the user for it to meet the standard of informed consent.76 
Equally, when terms and conditions are presented to users 
before they can access various online content, their ‘web-
wrap’ or ‘shrink-wrap’ nature raises concerns about how 
informed the user truly is.77 In both instances, the pervasive 
and habitual nature of agreeing to the terms coupled with 
the lack of technical understanding and opportunity to relect 
would fail an informed consent standard.78
Finally, people are already having their autonomy 
impacted when it comes to determining what privacy pro-
tections they should erect given the existing pressures and 
72 Zygmunt Bauman, Didier Bigo, Paulo Esteves, Elspeth Guild, 
Vivienne Jabri, David Lyon, R. B. J. Walker ‘After Snowden: 
Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance’ International Political Soci-
ology (2014) 8  pp.  121–144; George Lucas, ‘NSA Management 
Directive #424’ Ethics and International Afairs, 28/1, (2014) p. 31; 
Michael Kelly, ‘NSA: Snowden Stole 1.7 MILLION Classiied Docu-
ments And Still Has Access To Most Of Them,’ Business Insider, 13 
December 2013, http://www.busin essin sider .com/how-many-docs-
did-snowd en-take-2013-12 accessed 14 May 2014.; The Washington 
Post, ‘NSA Slides Explain the PRISM Data-Collection Program’, 10 
July 2013 available at http://www.washi ngton post.com/wp-srv/speci 
al/polit ics/prism -colle ction -docum ents/ accessed 14/05/14.
73 Sari Horowitz and William Branigin, ‘Lawmakers of Both Parties 
Voice Doubts about NSA Surveillance Programs’ The Washington 
Post July 17th 2013; Nick Hopkins and Matthew Taylor ‘David Blun-
kett Calls for Urgent Review of Laws Governing Security Services’ 
The Guardian 4th Nov 2013.
74 danah boyd, and Nicole Ellison, ‘Social Network Sites: Deinition, 
History, and Scholarship’ Journal of Computer-Mediated Commu-
nication 13 (2008) pp. 210–230. For work on third party access and 
the creation of digital proiles without the users awareness see Ralph 
Gross and Alessandro Acquisti, ‘Information Revelation and Privacy 
in Online Social Networks’ Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop 
on Privacy in the Electronic Society (2005) pp. 71–80. For work on 
people’s lack of awareness of the dangers Bernhard Debatin, Jennette 
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Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 15 (2009) p. 83–108.
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Netw 54 (2010) pp. 2787–805.
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biases that distort their decision-making processes. That 
is, if people existed in a neutral position, able to critically 
relect on their own desires and needs with all the relevant 
information then they would be able to make an autono-
mous decision, but because cyber-systems—web brows-
ers, settings, data agreements—exist in a complex set of 
arrangements people are already being interfered with. 
Indeed, behavioural economics and cognitive psychology 
have extensively outlined the distortive efect that defaults 
and framings can have on people without them consciously 
realising it.79 It is not surprising, therefore, that there has 
been a turn in the literature towards ‘libertarian paternal-
ism’ to counter such biases, argued for by Cass Sunstein and 
Richard Thaler who outlined a ‘relatively weak and non-
intrusive type of paternalism’.80 Taking the ‘presumption 
that individual choices should be respected is often based on 
the claim that people do an excellent job of making choices 
that promote their welfare, or at least better than third par-
ties could do’ is lawed given that there is ‘little empirical 
evidence to support this claim’.81 External inluencers are 
already in existence that distorts the decision-making pro-
cess. Given this it is not inconsistent to have a libertarian 
paternalist position that moves people in the direction that 
will make their lives better—resetting a default position or 
encouraging a particular decision—while not shutting down 
or blocking alternatives. As Anita Allen argues, ‘govern-
ments should not mandate, block… injurious choices… but 
should nudge’ and that ‘in the absence of such intervention 
by government or the private sector it is predictable that 
people will fall prey to the perils of procrastination, self-
control, information deicits, overreliance on rules of thumb, 
and cognitive biases’.82 People are not always consciously 
aware that they would have to alter their privacy settings 
from the defaults, which is especially problematic given that 
these settings are predominantly set to being more open than 
closed and that the procedures for changing these settings 
have been reported as being too diicult, time-consuming, 
or obscure for people to enact on a regular basis.83 Indeed, 
in surveys the default setting have reportedly only matched 
39% of people’s expectations, with a minority of people 
thinking or knowing how to change their privacy settings. 84
An argument can therefore be made that people would 
consent to the intervention. Indeed, generally we ‘call a pol-
icy paternalist only if it makes you behave diferently than 
you would have otherwise’.85 That is, ‘As a general matter, 
A isn’t acting paternalistically toward B if B consents to 
A’s action’.86 If the clearest cases of paternalism involve an 
interference (forcibly or non-forcibly) with the individual’s 
autonomy, then it would be inconsistent to claim that if the 
target’s autonomous decision is to agree then it is not pater-
nalistic.87 Interferences that are inline with an individual’s 
will do not violate their autonomy. The debate, therefore, 
rests more on whether there is a hypothetical, assumed, 
implicit or forthcoming consent.88 For example, ‘hypotheti-
cal consent’ is that whereby if the situation is ‘such that 
it could be said that any rational person would consent to 
the interference if he knew the relevant facts’ can be used 
to justify interventions on the assumption that it would not 
79 Richard H. Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions 
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interfere with the rational individual’s autonomy.89 If this is 
the case then it should be clear by now that given the threat 
represented to people’s privacy both as a result of routine 
intelligence surveillance and individual systematic igno-
rance, that there can be an assumed hypothetical consent or 
even a hypothetical request for intervention.90 This does not 
mean that people must have their data eternally protected. In 
line with the libertarian paternalist argument, the protections 
should ofer a more beneicial status quo for people; they 
are protected from the outset. But if people wish to move 
towards a more open system then they could opt to reveal-
ing their identity and activity publically, choosing to com-
municate unencrypted or without going through multiple 
anonymous nodes. But by shifting systems so that people are 
anonymous unless they wish otherwise would protect their 
privacy to a much greater extent. Importantly, this would 
signiicantly raise the bar on data collection and prevent en 
masse surveillance techniques. As one of the main concerns 
raised post-Snowden was the ease with which people’s data 
was accessed as well as the encompassing nature of the data-
trawls and by making the access to people’s data signii-
cantly more diicult the intelligence community would be 
forced to restrict its eforts to only those cases that really 
mattered to them, giving them the opportunity to make a 
clearer case as to why the data is needed.
The state’s justiied response
The technology needed to protect people’s privacy can be 
quite varied given the range of diferent ways people have 
their personal information collected. This should include, for 
example, preventing access to someone’s everyday browsing 
activity, stored data, and their meta-data including where 
they have been and with whom they have communication, as 
well as a shift in the privacy protocols on social media and 
web-browsers so that the default is set to a closed position, 
each with the option to move to a more open position if the 
user wished. Determining who and how this is achieved, 
however, is di cult. In terms of who should set the standard, 
a normative argument can be made that the state through 
human right legislation represents the most appropriate 
and direct means of initiating change. The state through the 
social contract has the obligation to protect all vital interests 
and so has an ethical mandate to establish these systems. 
Therefore in terms of who should act, the state appears at 
the top of the list. However, states are unlikely to instigate a 
change that would signiicantly limit their own intelligence 
collection activity.91 Equally, corporations that rely on sell-
ing or utilising people’s data are unlikely to limit their own 
proitability. Therefore, it will fall to those in the middle; 
those who are not likely to lose proit from such a change 
and could see the inancial or even ethical beneit of ofering 
a more protected system. For example, Apple has already 
noted the beneit that providing a more secure device to their 
users in terms of the competitive advantage it would give 
their product as well as their claimed desire to act ethically 
and protect people’s data. For web browsing, given technical 
limitations in order to create protections for online suring 
two main options present themselves: irst, Internet Service 
Providers should make changes to their infrastructure at the 
point where an individual accesses the internet, mainly the 
home router, which would also require the router manufac-
turer to change the software on their devices. Or secondly, 
the operating system vendor (Microsoft, Apple, etc.) can 
initiate protections at the operating systems level. In both of 
these options there would be signiicant beneits for these 
agents to put forward the case for their product ofering the 
user greater privacy.
The individual’s right to anonymising technology does 
not, however, undermine that the state can, when justiied, 
try to circumvent such barriers. It is not being argued that 
cyber-intelligence is always unjustiied. Indeed, when it is 
charged with protecting the political community from threats 
the intelligence community can be justiied in carrying out 
their own operations. The state has an ethical obligation 
to locate and prevent threats to people within the political 
community, and so some data collection can be justiied. 
However, what is unclear is that given the extra-layers of 
protection aforded by anonymising technology what new 
forms of state intervention are justiied. Indeed, the state 
has a limited number of options available, ranging from 
banning such technology altogether and making its posses-
sion or use illegal; forcing companies to leave backdoors for 
89 Danny Scoccia ‘In Defense of Hard Paternalism’ Law and Philos-
ophy 27/4 (2008) pp. 351–381; Jack Lively ‘Paternalism’ Royal Insti-
tute of Philosophical Supplements 15 (1983) pp.  147–165. Though 
some paternalists now argue for a subjective understanding whereby 
the intervention is consented inline with the individual’s particular 
and personal conception of good rather than that of the paternalist, 
this arguably increases the chance that the intervention will be inline 
with the individual’s autonomy. See Richard Thaler and Cass Sus-
tein Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happi-
ness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Julian Le Grand and 
Bill New, Government Paternalism: Nanny State or Helpful Friend 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
90 Consent and requests for intervention are essentially opposite 
sides of the same coin. Paternalism assumes a drive for intervention 
for people’s own good—in this case the need for more online privacy 
protections—and so a hypothetical consent can be seen as a hypothet-
ical request for intervention.
91 Bellaby argues that the intelligence community is still dominated 
by a Cold War, realist focus traditional understandings of national 
security that distort the perception of security to promote physical 
security often to the expense of other vital interests.
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exploitation; develop new technology that breaks the ano-
nymity; or use web-crawlers to collect that data that is avail-
able to detect patterns that would predict threats. This means 
understanding the diferent threats that various intelligence 
activities can represent to people’s autonomy and privacy, 
which is to be negotiated against the threat that anonymising 
technology poses both broadly and speciically.
Possessing and banning
The irst state-response could be to ban the possession or 
development of any technology that would allow people 
to go of-grid. This position has already found purchase in 
regimes such as China where it is illegal to try and circum-
vent their Golden Shield, but it is also gaining momentum in 
traditionally liberal societies such as the UK which after the 
terrorist attack in 2017 has stated a need to review encrypted 
communication as Home Secretary Amber Rudd has called 
for a ban on end-to-end encrypted communications.92 There 
are arguments that could be made that the individual, by 
simply owning or using dark web technology, for example, 
is entering a realm that is known to be used to carry out 
actions that can bring harm to others and threaten the politi-
cal community and so intelligence actors could be justiied 
in targeting those who download the software given the high 
propensity for illegal activity being carried out through it. 
Indeed, one of the problems levied at the intelligence com-
munity for collecting data on the open web was that there 
was no real reason for suspecting everyone and they were 
unable to discriminate between those who were a threat and 
everyone else who was innocent; those who lacks any form 
of probably cause. Therefore, by focusing on the dark web it 
does mean that intelligence is narrowing down to a subset of 
the community. Large swathes of the population are left out. 
Also, those within the dark web community have a high pro-
pensity to use it for criminal or terrorist activity and so pose 
a direct threat to a lot of other members of society. From 
the online trade of drugs and guns fuelling the wider drugs 
industry, through the millions in inancial costs that hackers 
represent to individuals and companies, to the sites that ofer 
‘violence on order’ including rape and assassination,93 the 
costs are signiicant and should be prevented.
However, rather than focusing down on a threatening 
actor in regards to what they have done, in reality it targets 
the individual according to the group to which he belongs; 
that is, labelling those who use the dark web as guilty by 
cyber-proximity to other dangerous elements and nothing 
else. At this stage, there is nothing that a dark web user 
has done wrong other than being in an arena where other 
individuals are known to carry out illegal activities. It is 
therefore closer to guilt by proximity. This is problematic as 
it represents a new form of proiling where one is proiled 
according to who one is in the cyber-vicinity of. This is 
indicative of a larger move in security towards pre-emptive 
risk assessment as security or justice techniques are ‘not 
based on individual suspicion but on the probability that 
an individual might be an ofender’.94 This raises the pros-
pect of individuals being targeted as a form of pre-crime, 
where they do not have to actually have done anything wrong 
but show a propensity that they might do wrong in the near 
future. Moreover, this type of examination is problematic 
as it relies, promotes and reinforces the use of proiling as a 
means of locating threats. This proiling takes the character-
istics of an ofender and overlays it over the group in order 
to identify and classify suspect populations.95 By focusing 
on singular attributes this type of proiling is problematic as 
it uses this as the base for locating pre-threats even though 
these other individuals do not have any of the other ‘threat-
ening’ attributes seen in the original ofender. That is, it 
‘identiies a certain number of people who do not share all 
the attributes of the group’s proile. […] one person may be 
identiied as a member of this group without having the same 
attributes and without sharing all the attributes. This kind 
of proiling has a higher probability of mistakenly identify 
people as members’.96 For example, online drug dealers can 
use the dark web as a means of selling their goods and so 
are proiled as being dark web users. Yet, not all dark web 
users are drug dealers. Targeting those individuals who use 
dark web technology therefore distributes a singular criminal 
aspect onto the rest of the online population even though 
there is no other attribute that marks them as a threat. Simply 
having the technology and using it to protect data or using 
it to explore the dark web itself is not suicient to count as 
a legitimate reason for targeting someone and is more about 
guilt by proximity rather than actually representing some 
form of threat. Therefore, possession of such technology 
92 Andrew Griin, ‘WhatsApp is Used by Paedophiles and Gangsters 
and Needs to be Stopped, Home Secretary Amber Rudd Says’ The 
Independent 3 October 2017. Available at http://www.indep enden 
t.co.uk/life-style /gadge ts-and-tech/news/whats app-amber -rudd-gover 
nment -home-secre tary-encry ption -paedo phile s-shut-down-a7981 616.
html.
93 United Nations Oice on Drugs and Crime, Economic and Social 
Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Traicking (1998) Available 
at https ://www.unodc .org/pdf/techn ical_serie s_1998-01-01_1.pdf.
94 Clive Norris and Michael McCahill ‘CCTV: Beyond Penal Mod-
ernism’ British Journal of Criminology 46/1 (2006) p. 98.
95 Lucia Zedner ‘Pre-Crime and Post Criminology’ Theoretical 
Criminology 11/2 (2007) 265.
96 V. Ferraris, F. Bosco, G Caiero, E. D’Angelo, Y. Suloyeva. Dein-
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alone is not suicient to warrant being investigated by the 
intelligence services. The bar must be higher than this.
Back doors
A second option highlighted by the debate between the 
USA’s FBI and technology manufacturer Apple and the 
state’s desire to force companies to create backdoors into 
equipment to ensure access by the intelligence community 
at a later date. Phones record information in both quantity 
and variety unlike anything previously seen and researchers 
have shown that they can be used to collect key presses,97 
location,98 recorded speech,99 and a person’s general daily 
activities both online and in real life. Equally, communica-
tion platforms such as WhatsApp have come to dominate 
how people communicate and organize their afairs. This 
has, in turn, prompted intelligence actors—most notably the 
FBI in its debate with Apple—to ask or even force compa-
nies to build in backdoors into to their programs in order to 
allow access when they wish.
Therefore arguments can be made that commissioning 
such backdoors ofers an opportunity for the intelligence 
community to act when they have a device they know has 
been used in the commission of a crime. Such an activity in 
theory would only target a particular phone for those indi-
viduals who have been involved in a crime or represent an 
immediate threat. However, demanding such backdoors can 
become problematic on a few fronts. Firstly, it again pre-
sumes that people are going to be a threat; that people are 
all potentially guilty and the backdoor is needed for when 
they commit a crime. Most individuals at the time of buy-
ing a phone have done nothing wrong and so should not 
be forced to have a substandard product because of their 
potential to cause a future crime. Creating such backdoors 
is unable to discriminate between individuals as they would 
have to ubiquitous to work, and while the backdoor would 
not be used against everyone, all devices’ security are being 
degraded; everyone is being treated as a potential threat 
rather than an actual threat. If, as it was argued, that all indi-
viduals have a right to protect themselves from intelligence 
protections in the absence of a threat, then these backdoors 
would directly impinge on this regardless of who they were 
or what they have done.
Second, once established there is nothing to prevent wide-
spread and unmonitored use of the backdoor and so lowers 
the bar to allow en masse surveillance. This contradicts the 
drive to make surveilling people diicult so as to limit its 
use. Third, the development of any backdoor system would 
place the individual under threat of being exploited by crimi-
nals, meaning that the cost is transferred to the individual 
and not the state. Finally, the framing of the threat is often 
in terms of impending terrorist attack, however in reality 
security services have expressed that there are several crimi-
nal (mainly drug) cases they would use the backdoor to aid 
in prosecution.100 Not only does this immediate indicate a 
creep of usage but does not have the same threat and urgency 
and so there is not the same perceived instant positive that 
can be used to outweigh the costs that would be faced by 
the individual.
Dark‑web crawling and analytics
A inal avenue available is to scan all dark web activity auto-
matically looking for patterns and trying to detect if there 
are any threat signiiers. By carrying out such large data-
mining and dataveillance scans it is possible to extract ‘use-
ful information from large datasets or databases’.101 Given 
the protection ofered by anonymising technology analytical 
scanning collects that information available by using crawl-
ers: ‘software programs that transverse the World Wide 
Web information space by following hypertext links and 
retrieving web documents’.102 These crawlers have become 
a rapidly growing area where ‘web-mining techniques can be 
used to detect and avoid terror threats’.103 For example, these 
crawlers collect visible data across forums, blogs, messaging 
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Jurgen Krumm and Eric Horvitz, ‘LOCADIO: Inferring Motion 
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boards, and websites looking for key terms that might indi-
cate a threat. While ‘stylometry is a form of authorship attri-
bution that relies on the linguistic information to attribute 
documents of unknown authorship based on the writing 
styles of a suspect set of authors’.104 Or in another example, 
in order to determine who has been visiting or downloading 
material from a dangerous website ‘website ingerprinting’ 
can be used where a ‘local passive-eavesdropper (an ISP) 
observes packets to and from a web-browsing client, and 
attempts to guess which pages the client has visited’; that is, 
by monitoring volume changes and matching times of those 
changes programs can link up which individual has visited 
a particular website.105
Such models argue that ‘Security analyst can use this 
model as a tool for assistance and may help to locate and 
analyse information quickly and efectively. The use of this 
model may be in the identiication and analysis of the feel-
ings/thinking of diferent posters belongs to a particular 
region or community’ and that ‘This model may help to pre-
dict and prevent violence by ofering insight into the nature 
of the communications, communities, and participants’.106 
Indeed, with its promise of anonymity the dark web forums 
ofers an powerful means of terrorist propaganda dissemi-
nation;107 a quick, easily accessed and cheap form of com-
munication between extremists to organise of attacks;108 the 
dissemination of their ‘message’ to diferent audiences; and 
as a space for grooming and radicalising individuals.109 By 
monitoring these interactions—what is being said, on what 
type of forum they are saying it, and the amount of traf-
ic created—it is possible to predict potential threats. For 
example, The Dark Web Forum Portal maintains a collec-
tion of 29 online jihadist forums, which currently contains 
14,297,961 messages and 1,553,122 threads from 362,495 
authors—making it a prime target for monitoring what is 
said and drawing conclusions from what is implied.110 As 
such these crawlers are being positioned as important coun-
ter-terrorism tools as the dark web becomes an arena for 
terrorists not only in terms of organising and facilitating 
their attacks but also in terms of recruitment and message 
dissemination.
In terms of its justiiability, one of the key problems 
with the en masse collections methods revealed by Edward 
Snowden in the open web is that they were unable by their 
very nature to discriminate between targets and that people’s 
actions and identity were too easily accessed and connec-
tions made. All information was collected without concern 
for it whose it was. In comparison, these crawlers and web-
site-inger printers ofer a slightly diferent result when used 
on the dark web. The relatively high technical diiculties 
associated with matching up users with websites through 
ingerprinting means that while it is possible it is not likely 
to be systematic or all encompassing and while the crawlers 
can often highlight threats, determining identities requires a 
secondary set of analytics and matchmaking. Therefore, the 
crawlers can be used to irst locate threats, but not identities, 
but once the threat has been located then only on those web-
sites or forums can the other ‘identifying’ scan be used. The 
beneit of this system is that people’s identity is protected 
unless they have shown indications of being a threat, while 
the technical limitations prevent en masse surveillance.
Conclusion
Anonymising technology and the dark web represent a clear 
challenge for the intelligence community. The protections 
that they ofer are highly diicult for them to overcome and 
prevent large-scale surveillance. This means, some would 
argue, that the development and use of such technology 
represents a clear threat to society as it limits the ability of 
the intelligence community from locating and preventing 
threats from causing people destructive harm. However, the 
opposite has been argued here in that such technology not 
only represents a useful means of people erecting protections 
over their cyber-privacy, but it is this very en masse surveil-
lance—from both governments and corporations—coupled 
with people’s limited awareness and ability to comprehend 
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such data collections that makes such technology ethically 
mandatory. That anonymising technology should be built 
into the fabric of cyberspace to provide a minimal set of 
protections over people’s information, and in doing so force 
the intelligence community to develop more targeted forms 
of data collection.
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